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LIMITATIONS ON WHO MAY ADOPT: A NATURAL 
MOTHER MAY NOT ADOPT HER OWN NATURAL 
CHILDREN NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSENT OF THE 
NATURAL FATHER AND THE CHILDREN. Green v. 
Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to raise a family is among those fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution.) This right, however, is not absolute.2 
In many cases, the state has a vested interest and may intervene in 
this relationship.3 This may be especially true in cases of adoption. 4 
Because adoption did not exist at common law, Maryland has 
developed a comprehensive statutory scheme governing adoption. S 
Maryland law, however, leaves unsettled precisely who is permitted 
to adopt. 6 Section 5-309 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland states that "/a]ny adult may petition a court to 
decree an adoption.'t'J Case law, however, reveals that the phrase 
"any adult" is subject to interpretation by the courts.8 The issue of 
1. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court held that 
constitutional liberty included not just freedom from bodily restraint, but also 
the right to marry, to establish a home, and to raise children. See id. at 399. 
2. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Supreme Court recognized 
that "the family itself is not beyond regulation." [d. at 166. The Court further 
reasoned that "[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the 
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, 
with all that implies. [A state] may secure this against impeding restraints and 
dangers, within a broad range of selection." [d. at 168. 
3. Cf Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App. 575, 588, 568 A.2d 1157,1163-64 
(1990) (holding that the state has a strong interest in requiring a responsible 
parent to support his or her children because otherwise the state is responsible). 
·4. Cf, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(a) (1991) ("The General 
Assembly finds that the policies and procedure of this subtitle that concern 
adoption are socially necessary and desirable."). 
5. See id. §§ 5-301 to -330; see also, e.g., Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 691, 
655 A.2d 901, 902 (1995). 
6. See, e.g., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b) (specifying the purpose of the adoption law); 
id. § 5-308 (specifying the legal effect of an adoption). 
7. [d. § 5-309(a) (emphasis added). 
8. See, e.g., Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. I, 497 A.2d 142 (1985) (holding that a 
natural father of a child born out of wedlock could adopt his own natural 
child); Ex Parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 133 A.2d 408, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
882 (1957) (holding that petition for adoption was properly denied on the 
grounds of prospective parents' advanced age); Venables v. Ayres, 54 Md. 
App. 520, 459 A.2d 601 (1983) (holding that a deceased person cannot become 
an adoptive parent). 
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whether a child's natural mother is among "any adult" permitted to 
adopt the child was recently addressed in Green v. Sol/enberger.9 The 
Green court held that "the General Assembly never intended for 
natural parents to be permitted to adopt their own legitimate chil-
dren."lo 
When David Brian Lenick and Dorothy Mae Green divorced in 
1983, Green, the natural mother, was awarded custody of her chil-
dren, and Lenick, the natural father, was ordered to pay child 
support. 11 In May 1991, the Circuit Court for Carroll County allowed 
Green to adopt her children with their consent, as well as the consent 
of Lenick.12 This order had the legal effect of terminating Lenick's 
parental rights. 13 When Lenick petitioned a Pennsylvania court to 
relieve him of his obligation to pay child support, Maryland requested 
a stay pending a Maryland court's determination of whether the 
adoption decree was valid.14 The Pennsylvania court subsequently 
granted the requested stay. IS 
A Maryland trial court vacated the adoption, declaring it void 
ab initio,16 and the court of special appeals affirmed. 17 In a unanimous 
decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the intermediate 
court's decision, holding that, despite the consent of the father and 
the children, the Circuit Court for Carroll County improperly allowed 
Green to adopt her three legitimate children.ls The court thus deter-
mined that such an adoption is legally ineffective and may be vacated 
more than one year after its making. 19 
In so holding, the court of appeals followed the express adoption 
policy of Marylancj20 as well as the majority of other jurisdictions.21 
9. 338 Md. 118; 656 A.2d 773 (1995). 
10. [d. at 127, 656 A.2d at 777. The court further held that, if such an adoption 
were permitted, it could be collaterally attacked at any time and, thus, vacated. 
See id. at 131, 656 A.2d at 779. This holding will not be addressed" in this 
casenote. Note, however, that the court of appeals cites no authority for this 
proposition. A later Maryland case, Montgomery County v. Revere National 
Corp., 341 Md. 366, 380, 671 A.2d 1, 7-8 (1996), cited Green for this 
proposition and added that the leading case in this area was Kelley v. Town 
0/ Milan, 127 U.S. 139 (1888). 
11. See Green, 338 Md. at 122,656 A.2d at 775. 
12. See id. at 123, 656 A.2d at 775. 
13. See id. Green was named the sole parent of the children and the children's 
surnames were changed from Lenick to Green. See id. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
16. See id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775. "Void ab initio" means void from its 
inception. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6 (6th ed. 1990). 
17. See Green v. Sollenberger, 100 Md. App. 686, 691, 642 A.2d 324, 327 (1994), 
a/I'd, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995). 
18. See Green, 338 Md. at 118-31, 656 A.2d at 773-79. 
19. See id. at 131, 656 A.2d at 779. 
20. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b) (1991). Section 5-303(b) states that 
1996] Green v. Sollenberger 203 
There are, however, several troubling facets of the court's decision 
in Green: first, the court departed from the plain language of the 
statute; 22 second, the holding suggested, without further analysis, that 
children could never benefit from the termination of their father's 
rights;13 third, the court's decision espoused a rigid definition of 
family and gave the state the power to intervene to enforce it;24 and 
fourth, the decision fostered a dual system of adoption - one for 
the poor and one for the rest of society.2S 
the purpose behind Maryland's adoption law is, among other things, to protect 
"children from unnecessary separation from their natural parents." Id. § 5-
303(b)(i). 
21. See Green, 338 Md. at 130, 656 A.2d at 779; see also, e.g., Marshall v. 
Marshall, 239 P. 36, 38 (Cal. 1925); In re Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d 
843, 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); In re Adoption of Graham, 409 N.E.2d 1067, 
1069-70 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1980); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Okla. 
1980); In re Estate of Baxter, 827 P.2d 184, 187 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992); 
Campbell v. Kindred, 554 P .2d 599, 600-01 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). But see 
McDonald v. Hester, 155 S.E.2d 720, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Petition of 
Curran, 49 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Mass. 1943). 
22. According to section 5-309(a), "[a]ny adult may petition a court to decree an 
adoption." FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1991). Yet in Green, the court held that 
"despite the broad unqualified language of Maryland's adoption statute, it was 
not the intention of the Legislature that any individual may be adopted by any 
adult." Green, 338 Md. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775 (quoting with approval the 
court of special appeals decision in that case) (emphasis added). This is contrary 
to the language in Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 12, 497 A.2d 142, 147 (1985), 
in which the court, interpreting this statute, held that "[i]n view of the broad, 
unqualified wording of Maryland's adoption statute ... we are unable to 
conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption in all circumstances 
by a natural parent of a child born out of wedlock." Id. (emphasis added). 
The court relied on a rule of construction which ·states that "where the language 
of a statute is clear, courts may not insert or omit words to make the statute 
express an intention not evident in its original form." Id. at 10-11, 497 A.2d 
at 147. Note, however, that the language in section 5-315 appears to place a 
restriction on the term "any adult" by requiring that a married petitioner join 
his or her spouse in a petition for adoption. This, however, was not the focus 
of the court's discussion. A discussion of the appropriateness of this provision 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
23. See Green, 338 Md. at 128,656 A.2d at 777-78. Upon further analysis, however, 
the court may have been able to identify possible social benefits to the children 
of having their father's rights terminated. See infra notes 155-68 and accom-
panying text. 
24. The court allowed the state to bring suit to invalidate an adoption decree that 
was consented to by all the parties involved. See Green, 338 Md. at 123, 656 
A.2d at 775. In Green, the father and the children consented to the adoption, 
as did the mother by filing for the adoption. See id.; see also infra notes 169-
88 and accompanying text. 
25. Cf Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem with the 
Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y, Winter 1994, 
at 3 (suggesting that the current welfare system creates a "'dual system of 
family law,' one for poor fathers and one for the rest of society"). See 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Child Support Generally26 
The general rule is that parents must provide support for their 
children. 27 This duty continues even after divorce.28 Adoption, how-
ever, severs all the legal duties and obligations of the living, natural 
parents. 29 The exception is that, in the case of adoption by a 
stepparent, the natural parent married to the stepparent is not relieved 
of his or her duties or obligations.30 In such cases, however, the 
parent not married to the stepparent is no longer obligated to pay 
child support. 31 During the process of a divorce, parents are often 
permitted to come to an agreement regarding custody and child 
support payments.32 The courts, however, have generally not allowed 
one natural parent to voluntarily waive their child's right to child 
support from the other parent. 33 
generally Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System oj Family Law:· Its 
Origin, Development, and Present Status (Part I), 15 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1964). 
26. For the most part, child support is not within the scope of this casenote and 
will only be addressed in a cursory manner. 
27. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(b) (Supp. 1996); cj. Stambaugh v. 
Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 112, 591 A.2d 501, 504 
(1991) ("Generally, the duty to support one's minor children may not be 
bargained away or waived. "). 
28. The court may issue child support orders upon the divorce of a child's parents. 
Sa?, e.g., Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 459, 648 A.2d 1016, 1018 (1994); 
Stambaugh, 323 Md. at 108, 591 A.2d at 502. 
29. Sa? MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308(b)(2) (1991). 
30. Sa? supra note 59. 
31. Cj. Stambaugh, 323 Md. at 106-14, 591 A.2d at 501-05 (holding that while a 
decree of adoption eliminates the father's duty to support the minor child 
subsequent to the adoption, it does not relieve the father of his duty to pay 
arrearage). 
32. Sa?, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL Dn.EMMA OF CUSTODY 134 (1992) (suggesting that approxi-
mately eighty to ninety percent of divorcing parents come to an agreement 
regarding custody and child support); see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow oj the Law: The Case oj Divorce, 88 
YALE L.J. 950,978-79 (1979) (suggesting that parents may even use custody as 
a bargaining chip in divorce agreements and that the parent who has a stronger 
desire for custody is often at a disadvantage in the bargaining process). 
33. See Stambaugh, 323 Md. at 106-14, 591 A.2d at 501-05. The father in 
Stambaugh consented to the adoption of his children by their stepfather in 
exchange for the mother's promise to waive the father's liability for past child 
support. Id. at 108, 591 A.2d at 502. The court held that this agreement was 
invalid because it violated Maryland's public policy. See id. at 112, 591 A.2d 
at 504 (citing as authority § 5-327 which forbids compensation in exchange for 
adoption); see also Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App. 575, 588, 568 A.2d 
1157, 1163 (1990) (holding that "[a] parent cannot agree to preclude a child's 
right to support by the other parent, or right to have that support modified"). 
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. B. Adoptions Generally 
Because the concept of adoption did not exist at common law, 34 
Maryland has developed a comprehensive statutory scheme to deal 
with adoption. 35 The primary consideration in an adoption proceeding 
is the best interest of the child.36 The stated purpose of Maryland's 
adoption law, however, is to protect all of the parties involved: the 
children, natural parents, and adoptive parents. 37 One aspect of this 
is that the adoptive parents are to be protected "from a future 
disturbance of their relationship with the child by a natural parent. "38 
C. Adoptions Permitted With or Without Consent 
Generally, a child may be adopted with the consent of the 
natural parents and, in some cases, even without consent. 39 Section 
5-311 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland 
provides for adoptions with the consent of both natural parents and 
the child.40 A child may be adopted without the consent of the 
natural parents if the natural parents' rights are terminated by a 
judicial proceeding. 41 Section 5-312 provides that in certain circum-
stances an individual may be adopted even without either the consent 
of a natural parent or a judicial proceeding terminating the rights of 
the natural parents.42 
D. Effect of Adoption 
The legal effect of an adoption is that the child is, for all intents 
and purposes, considered the child of the adoptive parents.43 Fur-
34. See Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 691, 655 A.2d 901, 902 (1995). 
35. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-301 to -330 (1991 & Supp. 1996). 
36. See, e.g., Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 122, 656 A.2d 773, 774 (1995); 
Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 469-70,648 A.2d 1016, 1023 (1994) ("[T)he 
controlling factor, or guiding principle, in ... adoption cases is ... what best 
serves the interest of the child; the paramount consideration is what will best 
promote the child's welfare, a consideration that is of 'transcendent impor-
tance.'''); In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113-14, 642 A.2d 201, 208-
09 (1994); In re Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561, 640 A.2d 1085, 
1<96 (1994). 
37. Sa! FAM. LAW § 5-303(b). 
38. Id § 5-303(b)(3)(ii). 
39. Sa! ide §§ 5-311 to -313. 
40. Section 5-311(b)(ii) calls for the consent of the individual to be adopted if the 
individual is at least 10 years old. See ide § 5-311(b)(ii). 
41. Sa! Id. § 5-311(b). In such cases, Maryland law requires the consent of the 
executive head of the child placement agency that has been awarded guardi-
anship over the individual, as well as the consent of the individual to be 
adopted if the individual is at least 10 years old. See ide 
42. See ide § 5-312. 
43. See ide § 5-308(b). Section 5-308(b) provides that, "after a decree of adoption 
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. thermore, "each living natural parent of the individual adopted is: 
(i) relieved of all parental duties and obligations to the individual 
adopted; and (ii) divested of all parental rights as to the individual 
adopted. "44 "'Adoption decrees cut the child off from the natural 
parent, who is made a legal stranger to his offspring. "'45 
Given the drastic and permanent nature of the effect of an 
adoption on the ties between the child and the natural parents, 
Maryland law places a heavy burden on those seeking to adopt. 46 
For example, section 5-313 requires a court to find by clear and 
convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to 
terminate the natural parents' rights before an adoption is granted 
without the consent of the natural parents.47 
In Dawson v. Eversberg,48 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
remanded, without affirmance or reversal, a decree granting an 
adoption to the natural father while reserving the mother's parental 
rights.4) The court of appeals determined that the trial judge was 
without "authority to decree the adoption and at the same time" 
reserve parental rights in the mother because the effect of an adoption 
is to sever the rights of all living parents not married to the adopting 
parent. 50 If the adoption were left in effect, the natural mother would 
have no rights to her children.51 Because it was uncle~r whether the 
trial judge would have granted the adoption had he been aware of 
the true effect it would have, the court remanded for reconsideration 
of the matter. 52 
Because of the harsh consequences of an adoption recognized in 
both statutory and case law in Maryland, there is also great concern 
is entered: (1) the individual adopted: (i) is the child of the petitioner for all 
intents and purposes; and (ii) is entitled to all the rights and privileges of and 
is subject to all the obligations of a child born to the petitioner in wedlock." 
See id.; see also Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 668, 691, 655 A.2d 901, 902 
(1995). 
44. FAM. LAW § 5-308(b)(2). 
45. In re Adoption No. 10941,335 Md. 99, 113,642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994) (quoting 
Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275-76 (1960»; accord 
Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 313, 262 A.2d 729, 732 (1970). 
46. See, e.g., Dawson, 257 Md. at 313, 262 A.2d at 732. This is particularly true 
if the natural parent whose rights are being severed has not consented to the 
adoption. See id. (citing with approval Walker, 221 Md. at 284, 157 A.2d at 
275-76). 
47. See FAM. LAW § 5-313. 
48. 257 Md. 308, 262 A.2d 729 (1970). 
49. Id. at 315, 262 A.2d at 733. In Dawson, the adoption decree included the 
phrase "nothing in this decree shall affect ... [the natural mother's] parental 
rights ... as the natural mother of said infants." Id. at 312, 262 A.2d at 731. 
50. Id. at 312-14, 262 A.2d at 731-32. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 314, 262 A.2d at 732. 
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regarding who may adopt a child and precisely what effect an 
adoption will have on a child's ties to his or her natural parents. 
E. Who May Adopt 
Section 5-309 governs who may adopt a child. 53 "Any adult" is 
said to have the right to "petition a court to decree an adoption. "54 
The provision in section 5-309(b) which expressly permits adoption 
by a single person is significant because it suggests that two people 
are not needed to adopt a child. 55 While the language of this section 
appears to be broad and unqualified,56 courts have provided a much 
narrower interpretation. 57 
F. Effect of Adoption on Other Relationships 
While adoption generally terminates the parental rights of all 
living parents,58 there are exceptions. When a stepparent adopts a 
child, the rights of the stepparent's spouse are not terminated. 59 Some 
53. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309 (1991). 
54. Id § 5-309(a). 
55. See id. § 5-309(b); see also Ex parte Libertini, 244 Md. 542, 224 A.2d 443 
(1966); In re Adoption No. 90072022, 87 Md. App. 630, 590 A.2d 1094 (1991). 
Note, however, that language in section 5-315 appears to place a restriction on 
the term "any adult" by requiring that a married petitioner join their spouse 
in a petition for adoption. This, however, was not the focus of the court's 
discussion in Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995), and 
thus, a discussion of the appropriateness of this provision is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
56. See, e.g., Green, 338 Md. at 127,656 A.2d at 777; Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 
1, 12, 497 A.2d 142, 147 (1985). 
57. See, e.g., Ex parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 103-04, 133 A.2d 408, 410 (1956), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957) (holding that while the age of prospective 
adoptive parents was not a disqualifying factor, it was an appropriate consid-
eration); Venables v. Ayres, 54 Md. App. 520, 533, 459 A.2d 601, 608 (1983). 
But see Bridges, 304 Md. at 13, 497 A.2d at 148 (holding that FAM. LAW § 5-
312 permits adoption by natural father of a child born out of wedlock); 
Libertini, 244 Md. at 543, 224 A.2d at 444 (holding that the law does not 
require adopting person to be married or have been married). 
58. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. 
59. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207(a) (1991 & Supp. 1996). According 
to section 1-207(a), 
[a]n adopted child shall be treated as a natural child of his adopting 
parent or parents. On adoption, a child no longer shall be considered 
a child of either natural parent, except that upon adoption by the 
spouse of a natural parent, the child shall still be considered the child 
of that natural parent. 
Id.; cf FAM. LAW § 5-315(a) (stating that the spouse of an adoptive parent 
need not be joined in a petition for adoption if the spouse is a natural parent 
of the individual to be adopted and has consented to the adoption). 
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states recognize similar exceptions following the adoption of a child 
by a lesbian or gay partner. 60 Some states also allow a natural father 
to use the adoption process to legitimate his child.61 These states 
extend the stepparent exception, thereby allowing the natural mother 
to retain her rights following the adoption of her child by the natural 
father.62 For example, in In re Jessica W. ,63 a New Hampshire court 
held that a natural mother could retain rights to her child following 
the adoption of the child by the natural father. 64 Other states expressly 
permit an adoption by the unmarried father or mother of the 
individual to be adopted.6s Maryland, however, has not granted 
specific adoption rights to the fathers of illegitimate children. 66 
G. The Current Debate 
While other states generally have not permitted a natural parent 
to adopt his or her own child,67 the court of appeals seemingly left 
this issue open in Bridges v. Nice/y.68 In Bridges, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that an adoption that would cut off the 
mother's rights might be permitted despite the mother's refusal to 
consent where the father had already legitimated the child.69 In 
Bridges, Beverly Ann Nicely and Jerry Wayne Bridges, Sf. had a 
son out of wedlock. 70 Bridges, the natural father, appeared on the 
60. Sre, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); cf In re M.M.D., 
662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (extending stepparent exception to homosexual couple 
living together in committed personal relationship despite the fact that they 
were not married). But see In re Jason C., 533 A.2d 32 (N.H. 1987) (holding 
that two unmarried adults could not jointly petition to adopt a child). 
61. See, e.g., In re Jessica W., 453 A.2d 1297 (N.H. 1982); In re Adoption of a 
Child by A.R., 378 A.2d 87 (N.J. 1977); In re A.J.J., 438 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y. 
Sur. Ct. 1981). But cf Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 313-15, 262 A.2d 
729, 732-33 (1970) (recognizing the statute currently codified as .MD. CODE 
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207 (Supp. 1996) as a less traumatic approach to 
legitimation under Maryland law); see also Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 6, 
497 A.2d 142, 144 (citing Dawson, 257 Md. at 308-15, 262 A.2d at 729-33»; 
irifra note 74 (discussing Maryland's legitimation statute). 
62. Sre supra note 61. 
63. 453 A.2d 1297 (N.H. 1982). 
64. Id. at 1300. 
65. Sre, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.23.020(3) (Michie 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
9-104(3) (Michie 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-106(4) (1995); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-15-03(3) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.3(4) (West 1987). 
66. Sre, e.g., In re Malmstedt, 243 Md. 92, 94, 220 A.2d 147, 149 (1966); Dawson, 
257 Md. at 308-15, 262 A.2d at 729-33 (assuming, without deciding, that a 
father could adopt the illegitimate child). 
67. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. 
68. 304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985). 
69. See id. at 12-13, 497 A.2d at 147-48. 
70. See id. at 2, 497 A.2d at 142. 
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birth certificate as the father. 71· Soon after the birth of their son, 
Bridges acknowledged in writing that he was the father and a 
paternity decree was issued.72 When the couple later separated and a 
custody dispute ensued, Bridges attempted to adopt his son and 
thereby cut off Nicely's ties to the child. 73 The court suggested that 
despite the fact that the effect of an adoption might not be precisely 
the same as the effect of legitimation, Maryland's legitimation statute74 
was '''not limited in its scope and application to matters of inheri-
tance only,' but was legally sufficient" to establish a legal relationship 
between parent and child. 75 Suggesting that an adoption of one's 
own natural child was possible under Maryland law, the court re-
manded the case for a determination of, among other things, whether 
it was "in the best interests of [the child] to grant the adoption [by 
his father] and thus terminate all of his parental ties to his mother."76 
This ostensibly left open the possibility that natural parents in Mary-
land could adopt their own children over the objections of the other 
natural parent. 
Other states, including Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon, generally 
have not allowed a natural parent to adopt his or her own legitimate 
child. 77 In In re Adoption of Kohorst,18 the Court of Appeals of 
Ohio refused to permit a father to use an adoption proceeding to 
terminate the mother's rights to her legitimate child despite the fact 
that she had not contributed child support and had not made regular 
visits. 79 Prior to Kohorst, an Ohio trial court had held that a mother 
71. See id. at 3, 497 A.2d at 143. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b) (Supp. 1996). A child born 
out of wedlock is presumptively the child of his mother but not his father. 
See id. § 1-208(a). Subsection (b) provides four ways for a father to legitimate 
his child born out of wedlock. Id. § 1-208(b). A child born out of wedlock is 
considered the child of his biological father only if the father: 
Id 
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an action 
brought under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings; (2) Has 
acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father; (3) Has openly 
and notoriously recognized the child to be his child; or (4) Has 
subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged himself, orally 
or in writing, to be the father. 
75. Bridges, 304 Md. at 7-8, 497 A.2d at 145 (quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 
536, 542, 283 A.2d 777, 780 (1971». 
76. Id. at 14, 497 A.2d at 148. 
77. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d843, 846 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1992); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Okla. 1980); Campbell v. 
Kindred, 554 P.2d 599, 600 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). 
78. 600 N.E.2d 843 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
79. See id. at 849. In Kohorst, the father claimed that the mother had failed to 
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could not adopt her own child thereby cutting off the father's ties 
with the child, notwithstanding the father's consent. 80 The court 
reasoned that a father's duty to support his minor children is a duty 
which he owes to the statel and thus, the father cannot contract with 
the mother to relieve himself of this liability.81 An Oklahoma court 
held that a natural parent could not adopt her own legitimate child.82 
The court stressed the fact that an adoption in such cases would not 
confer upon the child any additional benefits.83 Similarly, an Oregon 
court invalidated an attempted adoption by a natural father that 
severed the rights of the mother. 84 
Several states, however, have found no legal impediment to a 
natural parent adopting his or her own child.8s The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, for example, permitted an unmarried mother 
to adopt her own natural child who was born out of wedlock.86 
Similarly, a New Jersey court permitted a natural father to adopt 
his own child whose mother and legal father had died.87 A Georgia 
court, likewise, held that natural parents are not precluded from 
adopting their own children. 88 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has suggested that one parent 
will not be permitted to consent to adoption in order to terminate 
child support payment arrearage.89 Yet, Maryland's adoption statute 
requires the consent of natural parents to the adoption of their 
children by either a stranger or a relative,9O and for the adoption of 
make child support payments. See id. at 844. The court, however, noted that 
the judgment awarding the father custody made no such requirement. See id. 
The father further claimed that he feared that the child would at some time 
be adversely affected by her mother's "lifestyle." See id. at 845-46. The court, 
concerned with the harsh consequences of permanently and completely termi-
nating the child's ties to the mother, rejected the father's attempt to adopt his 
child. See id. at 847-48. The admitted sole purpose of the adoption was 
terminating the mother's rights. See id. at 848. The court labeled such action 
by the father as "overkill." See id. at 845-46. 
80. See In re Adoption of Graham, 409 N.E.2d 1067, 1069-70 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 
1980). 
81. See id. at 1069. 
82. See Leake, 614 P.2d at 1109 (reasoning that the Legislature did not intend to 
provide a proceeding for a parent to adopt his or her natural legitimate child). 
83. See id. at 1109. 
84. See Campbell v. Kindred, 554 P.2d 599 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). 
85. See, e.g., McDonald v. Hester, 155 S.E.2d 720, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); In 
re Curran, 49 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Mass. 1943); In re Adoption of Adult by 
G.V.C., 581 A.2d 123, 124-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990). 
86. See Curran, 49 N.E.2d at 432-35. 
87. See G. V.C., 581 A.2d at 123-25. 
88. See McDonald, 155 S.E.2d at 721. 
89. See Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106,591 A.2d 
501 (1991). 
90. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-309, -311 (1991 & Supp. 1996). 
1996] Green v. Sollenberger 211 
a child by a single parent. 91 Moreover, in Bridges v. Nicely,n the 
court suggested there might be cases where a natural parent would 
be permitted to adopt a natural child, despite the fact that: (1) the 
other parent's ties to the child would be severed; and (2) the other 
parent had not consented to the adoption.93 Green v. Sol/enbergetJ4 
combined these issues by addressing whether an adoption of legitimate 
children by their natural custodial mother, but not her husband, may 
be granted where both natural parents have consented and such 
adoption would have the effect of severing the father's ties and 
responsibility to the children.9s 
III. THE INSTANT CASE 
In Green v. Sol/enberger,96 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
addressed the issue of whether Maryland's adoption law permits a 
natural mother to adopt her own legitimate child, with the consent 
of the other natural parent, thereby severing the relationship between 
the children and their natural father. 97 
A. Facts 
David Brian Lenick (Lenick) and Dorothy Mae Green (Green) 
were married in 1979 and had three legitimate children.98 When they 
divorced in 1983, Green was awarded custody of the children, and 
Lenick was ordered to pay child support. 99 Custody remained with 
Green except for a one-year period in which the children resided with 
LenickYJO Lenick was consistently either behind in his payments or 
failed to pay at all. 101 In 1990, the right to receive child support was 
assigned to the state when Green began to receive Aid for Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) to help support the children. 102 
In May 1991, with the consent of both Lenick and the children, 
the Circuit Court for Carroll County allowed Green to adopt her 
children, thus severing their ties to Lenick. lo3 Over a year later, 
91. See ide § 5-309(b). 
92. 304 Md. I, 497 A.2d 142 (1985). 
93. See ide 
94. 338 Md. lIS, 656 A.2d 773 (1995). 
95. See ide at 120-23, 656 A.2d at 773-75. 
96. Id. at l1S-31, 656 A.2d at 773-79. 
97. See ide 
9S. See ide at 122, 656 A.2d at 775. 
99. See ide 
100. See ide 
101. See ide 
102. See ide 
103. See ide at 123, 656 A.2d at 775. 
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Lenick petitioned a Pennsylvania court to relieve him of his obligation 
to pay child support. 104 At Maryland's request, the Pennsylvania 
court stayed the suspension pending a Maryland court determination 
of whether the adoption decree was valid.IOS The Executive Director 
of Maryland's Child Support Enforcement Agency (State) filed a 
complaint seeking to have the adoption vacated. 106 The trial court 
concluded that "the complaint for adoption failed to allege that 
substantial social benefits would accrue to the children," and vacated 
the adoption, declaring it void ab initio. I07 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judg-
ment holding that "despite the broad, unqualified language of Mary-
land's adoption statute, it was not the intention of the Legislature 
that any individual may be adopted by any adult, totally without 
qualification or restriction concerning blood relationships." 108 The 
court of appeals granted certiorari.109 
B. Appellant's Claims 
On appeal, Green, relying on the broad language of the statute, 
argued that natural parents should be permitted to adopt their own 
children because such an action would not violate Maryland law or 
public policy.lIo She further urged the court to follow Bridges v. 
Nicely, III in which the same court held that "[i]n view of the broad, 
unqualified wording of Maryland's adoption statute . .. we are 
unable to conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption 
in all circumstances by a natural parent of a child born out of 
wedlock. "112 Green claimed that the circuit court had erroneously 
distinguished this case from Bridges. 113 
Moreover, Green argued that given the holding in Carroll County 
Department of Social Services v. Edelmann,1I4 adoption was her only 
viable alternative. liS In Edelmann, the court held that the only way 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775. 
108. See id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775-76 (quoting Green v. Sollenberger, 100 Md. 
App. 686, 691, 642 A.2d 324, 327 (1994), aff'd Green v. Sollenberger, 338 
Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995». 
109. See id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 776. 
110. See id. (referring to MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1991) which states 
that "[a)ny adult" may adopt). 
111. 304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985). 
112. /d. at 12, 497 A.2d at 147 (emphasis added). 
113. See Green, 338 Md. at 125, 656 A.2d at 776. 
114. 320 Md. 150, 577 A.2d 14 (1990). 
115. See Green, 338 Md. at 125, 656 A.2d at 776. 
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to terminate a parent's rights was through guardianship or adop-
tion. 116 Green also noted that, although her husband did not join her 
in the adoption petition, section 5-309(b) expressly allowed an adop-
tion by a single person. 117 
Emphasizing that the children's best interest is the overriding 
concern in an adoption, Green argued that this adoption would serve 
her children's best interest because it would protect them from future 
disturbance in their relationship with her.1l8 She argued that the 
children would actually benefit from the adoption because they could 
never be held liable to support their father. 1I9 Finally, Green argued 
that even if the adoption were invalid, the court did not have the 
authority to strike it down because it had been more than one year 
since the adoption was entered.I20 . 
C. The Court's Rationale 
Despite Green's arguments to the contrary, the court held that 
Green could not adopt her own children. 121 First, the court rejected 
Green's interpretation of section 5-309(b), holding that "despite the 
broad and seemingly unqualified language used in these provisions, 
the General Assembly never intended for natural parents to be 
permitted to adopt their own legitimate children.' '122 The court also 
emphasized that pursuant to section 5-303, one of the primary goals 
of Maryland's adoption statute is to protect the child from "unnec-
essary separation from their natural parents." 123 This goal, the court 
pointed out, was not furthered by Green's adoption of her children, 124 
as it severed the children's ties to their natural father. 
Moreover, the court noted that "another primary purpose of 
adoption is to create a legal connection between an adoptive parent 
and child who are not biologically related, thereby conferring on 
each legal rights and obligations that did not previously exist." 125 
116. See Carroll County Dep't of Soc. Servo v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 
577 A.2d 14, 26 (1990). 
117. See Green, 338 Md. at 125, 656 A.2d at 776. 
118. See id. at 126, 656 A.2d at 776. 
119. See id. 
120. See id. at 126, 656 A.2d at 777. Green cited section 5-325 which states that 
"[a] court may not receive a petition to invalidate a final decree of adoption 
because of procedural or jurisdictional defect unless the petition is filed within 
1 year after the entry of the final decree of adoption." MD. CoDE ANN., FAM. 
LAW § 5-325 (1991). 
121. See Green, 338 Md. at 118-31, 656 A.2d at 773-79. 
122. Id. at 127, 656 A.2d at 777. 
123. Id 
124. See id. 
125. Id. at 127-28, 656 A.2d at 777 (emphasis added). The court, however, cited 
no authority for this broad proclamation. See id. 
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Importantly, the adopted children must acquire a new legal relation-
ship or at least some social benefit.l26 The court concluded that 
Green's children did not acquire a new relationship from the adoption 
and, moreover, acquired no additional social benefits. 127 
The court opined that the children were harmed as a result of 
the adoption.128 The court noted five losses that the children would 
experience if the adoption were permitted to stand: first, the children 
would lose their right to any current support from their father; 
second, they would lose the right to future support from their father; 
third, they would forfeit their right to take by intestacy from and 
through their father; fourth, they would lose the right to bring a 
wrongful death action on the father's behalf; and finally, they would 
"lose the opportunity to have any sort of filial relationship with 
their father. "129 
The court also noted that the granting of such an adoption 
would violate public policy.130 The court was particularly concerned 
that Green's failure to include her husband as a party in the adoption 
petition left the children "fatherless. "131 Significantly, this in itself 
is a violation of Maryland's adoption law which requires the joining 
of the spouse of a petitioner for adoption. 132 Failure of Green to 
join her husband, the court held, was "clearly against public policy 
and such a misuse of the adoption statute [would] not be allowed."133 
Next, the court distinguished Green's case from Bridges v. 
Nicely. 134 The court asserted that in Bridges the father had a legitimate 
reason for undertaking to adopt his child, while in Green the mother's 
purpose was clearly against public policy.13s According to the Green 
court, the father in Bridges wanted to adopt in order to legitimate 
his child who was born out of wedlock, 136 whereas the mother in 
Green did not have any such appropriate purpose.137 The court further 
126. See id. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 128-29, 656 A.2d at 778. 
129. Id. 
130. See id. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778. 
131. Id. 
132. See id. at 129 n.5, 656 A.2d at 778 n.5 (citing § 5-315(a) which states that 
"[i]f a petitioner for adoption is married, the petitioner's spouse shall join the 
petition"). But cf. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(b) (1991) ("[C]ourt 
may not deny petition for adoption solely because the petitioner is single or 
does not have a spouse."); In re Adoption No. 90072022/CAD, 87 Md. App. 
630, 590 A.2d 1094 (1991) (holding that law does not require that adopting 
parent be married). 
133. Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778. 
134. 304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985). 
135. See Green, 338 Md. at 129-30, 656 A.2d at 778. 
136. See id. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778. 
137. See id. 
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analogized Green to Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Ad-
ministration,138 in which the court held that it was a violation of 
public policy for one parent to waive child support payments from 
the other parent in exchange for that parent's consent to an adop-
tion. 139 
Finally, the court declared, with little analysis, that the adoption 
was ineffective and thus voidable and subject to collateral attack at 
any time.l40 The case was viewed as a collateral attack and, thus, 
declared void ab initio. 141 
IV. ANAL YSIS 
The court's decision in Green is troubling for several reasons: 
first, the court departed from the plain language of the statute; 142 
second, the holding suggested, without further analysis, that children 
could never benefit from the termination of their natural father's 
rights; 143 third, the court's decision espoused a rigid definition of 
family and gives the state the power to intervene to enforce it; 144 and 
138. 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991). 
139. See id. 
140. See Green, 338 Md. at 131, 656 A.2d at 779. 
141. See id. 
142. According to section 5-309(a), "[a]ny adult may petition a court to decree an 
adoption." See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1991). Yet in Green, 
the court held that "despite the broad unqualified language of Maryland's 
adoption statute, it was not the intention of the Legislature that any individual 
may be adopted by any adult." Green, 338 Md. at 124,656 A.2d at 775 (1995) 
(quoting with approval the court of special appeals's decision in that case) 
(emphasis added). This is contrary to Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 12, 497 
A.2d 142, 147 (1985), in which the court, interpreting this statute, held that 
"~]n view of the broad, unqualified wording of Maryland's adoption statute 
... we are unable to conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption 
in all circumstances by a natural parent of a child .born out of wedlock." [d. 
(emphasis added). The Bridges court relied on a rule of construction which 
states that "where the language of a statute is clear, courts may not insert or 
omit words to make the statute express an intention not evident in its original 
form." [d. at 10-11, 497 A.2d at 147. Note, however, that the language in 
section 5-315(a) appears to place a restriction on the term "any adult" by 
requiring that a married petitioner join their spouse in a petition for adoption. 
This was not the focus of the court's discussion. A discussion of the appro-
priateness of this provision is beyond the scope of this paper. 
143. See Green, 338 Md. at 128-29, 656 A.2d at 777-78. Upon further analysis, 
however, the court may have been able to identify possible social benefits to 
the children of having their father's rights terminated. See supra note 23; see 
also infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text. 
144. The court allowed the state to bring suit to invalidate an adoption decree that 
was consented to by all the parties involved. Green, 338 Md. at 123, 656 A.2d 
at 775. In Green, the father and the children consented to the adoption, as 
did the mother by filing for the adoption. [d. at 123, 656 A.2d at 774; see 
also infra notes 169-88 and accompanying text. 
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fourth, the decision. fostered a dual system of adoption - one for 
the poor and one for the rest of society.14s 
A. Statutory Construction 
According to section 5-309(a), "[a]ny adult may petition a court 
to decree an adoption. "146 Yet in Green, 147 the court violated the 
basic rule of statutory construction it had embraced in Bridgesl48 
which stated that "where the language of a statute is clear, courts 
may not insert or omit words to make the statute express an intention 
not evident in its original form." 149 The Bridges court, interpreting 
section 5-309(a), held that "[i]n view of the broad, unqualified 
wording of Maryland's adoption statute ... we are unable to con-
clude that the Legislature intended to prohibit adoption in all cir-
cumstances by a natural parent of a child born out of wedlock." ISO 
In Green, the court implicitly rejected its former interpretation of 
the statute,ISI holding that "'despite the broad unqualified language 
of Maryland's adoption statute, it was not the intention of the 
Legislature that any individual may be adopted by any adult."IS2 The 
court, however, did not overrule Bridges. JS3 By not explicitly rejecting 
its contradictory holding in Bridges, the court of appeals left the 
lower courts with little guidance as to how to interpret the statute 
in the future. ls4 
145. Cf Levesque, supra note 25, at 3 (suggesting that the current welfare system 
creates a "'dual system of family law,' one for poor fathers and one for the 
rest of society"). See generally tenBroek, supra note 25, at 257. 
146. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1991). 
147. 338 Md. at 118-31, 656 A.2d at 773-79. 
148. 304 Md. 1, 12, 497 A.2d 142, 147 (1985). 
149. Id. at 10-11, 497 A.2d at 147. 
150. Id. (emphasis added). 
151. Note, however, that the court did not overrule Bridges. See Green, 338 Md. 
at 130, 656 A.2d at 778. 
152. Id. at 124, 656 A.2d at 775 (quoting with approval Green v. Sollenberger, 100 
Md. App. 686, 642 A.2d 324 (1994), a/I'd Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 
118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995» (emphasis added). 
153. See id. at 130, 656 A.2d at 778 (stating that "[t]he situation before us in the 
instant case is very different from that presented in Bridges. "). 
154. It may be argued that the court of appeals was directing the lower courts to 
make a distinction between adopting one's own legitimate child and adopting 
one's own illegitimate child. A closer examination of Bridges, however, reveals 
that it would be inappropriate to draw this distinction because the children in 
both cases were legitimate. See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of drawing a distinction between Bridges and Green based on 
legitimacy. 
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B. Social Bene/It 
In Green, the court concluded that "no beneficial consequences 
will attach as a result of an adoption that these children do not 
already enjoy as Green's legitimate children" ISS and that the children 
would, in fact, lose benefits.ls6 There is strong authority in support 
of this position. IS7 In so holding, however, the Green court, as have 
other courts, failed to examine the full range of possibilities. 
First, in analyzing potential losses the children might suffer, the 
court placed too great an emphasis on monetary losses. Four of the 
five losses identified by the court were economic.lss This narrow 
focus prevented the court from recognizing that children do not 
necessarily benefit from efforts to force fathers to pay child support 
and that, in fact, the children may actually suffer .IS9 The final 
potential loss discussed by the court - that the children would "lose 
the opportunity to have any sort of filial relationship with their 
155. Green, 338 Md. at 130, 656 A.2d at 778. 
156. Id at 128-29, 656 A.2d 777-78; see supra text accompanying notes 125-27. 
157. See Green, 338 Md. at 130, 656 A.2d at 779; see also, e.g., Marshall v. 
Marshall, 239 P. 36, 38 (Cal. 1925); In re Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d 
843, 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); In re Adoption of Graham, 409 N.E.2d 1067 
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1980); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Okla. 1980); 
In re Estate of Baxter, 827 P .2d 184, 187 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992); Campbell v. 
Kindred, 554 P.2d 599, 600-01 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). But see McDonald v. 
Hester, 155 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); In re Curran, 49 N.E.2d 432, 
434 (Mass. 1943). 
158. See Green, 338 Md. at 130, 656 A.2d at 779. First, the court noted, the 
children would lose their right to any current support from their father. See 
id at 128, 656 A.2d at 778. The second potential loss identified by the court 
WlL'l loss of the right to future support from their father. See id. Third, the 
court noted, the children would forfeit their right to take by intestacy from 
and through their father. See id. And, fourth, the children would lose the 
right to bring a wrongful death action on the father's behalf. See id. 
159. Cj. Levesque, supra note 25, at 37. It is insignificant to the children involved 
where the money comes from as long as they are provided for. Thus, if Green 
receives benefits from the state the children will not suffer. The state and its 
citizens may suffer from having to pay for benefits, but this should not be 
confused with what is in the best interests of the children. Moreover, Levesque 
suggests that efforts to force fathers to pay child support may actually harm 
the children. See Levesque, supra note 25, at 37. Levesque argues that often 
fathers do not have the resources to pay child support and are unwilling to do 
so. See id. Significantly, that is the case with Lenick who, prior to the adoption, 
was consistently either behind in his payments or did not pay at all. See Green, 
338 Md. at 122, 656 A.2d at 775. In fact, it was for this reason that Green 
signed over the child support payments in order to receive benefits from AFDC. 
See id. See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text (suggesting that Green's 
collection of AFDC benefits was what prompted the state to get involved and 
protest an adoption otherwise consented to by all parties concerned). See 
generally Levesque, supra note 25, at 31-32 (arguing that efforts to enforce 
fathers' child support obligations are not cost effective). 
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father, "160 is illusory. 161 Often fathers, as in Green, elect not to 
be part of their children's lives. In such cases, forcing fathers to pay 
child support payments is unlikely to make them more amenable to 
developing a relationship with their children. 162 
Upon further analysis, the court might have also been able to 
identify various possible benefits. The children might have benefitted 
from the finality of an adoption through protection from future 
disturbance by their father .163 Maryland statutory law implicitly rec-
ognizes the importance of such stability following an adoption in 
section 5-303 which states that one of the purposes of the adoption 
statutes is to protect "adoptive parents ... from a future disturbance 
of their relationship with the child by a natural parent."I64 The court 
of appeals should have recognizect that children who remain with 
one natural parent might similarly benefit. Given the emotional 
trauma children experience when their parents divorce, a child might 
benefit from the stability of knowing precisely which parent or 
parents will remain in their lives.16S Moreover, if the children's ties 
to their father are severed through an adoption, the children escape 
the possibility of being forced to support their father if he becomes 
destitute. 166 
The foregoing are just a few examples of possible situations in 
which a child could benefit from the permanent termination of a 
relationship with a natural parent. Although this adoption may not 
have been the ideal way to terminate a natural parent's relationship, 
160. Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778. 
161. Cj. Levesque, supra note 25, at 42 (suggesting that when the state attempts to 
enforce child support obligations of natural fathers the intended benefits to 
children and mothers are "more spurious than real"). 
162. See Levesque, supra note 25, at 40-41 (suggesting that fathers rarely develop 
social relationships with children they are forced to support). 
163. Cf" e.g., Qureshi v. Prince George's County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 11 Md. 
App. 615, 276 A.2d 675 (1971) (recognizing that the foundation underlying all 
adoptions is the need to . surround the final decree with a high degree of 
certainty). 
164. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b)(3)(ii) (1991). 
165. Cf, Levesque, supra note 25, at 19-20 (stating that one criticism of AFDC is 
that it undermines family stability). 
166. See In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 2152A, 2153A, 2154A, 100 Md. App. 
262,641 A.2d 889 (1994) (holding that termination of a person's parental rights 
through adoption negates the child's duty to support that parent under § 13-
102). Section 13-102(a) provides that "[iJf a destitute parent is in this State 
and has an adult child who has or is able to earn sufficient means, the adult 
child may not neglect or refuse to provide the destitute parent with food, 
shelter, care, and clothing." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-102(a) (1991). 
Section 13-103(b)(3) allows a destitute parent to file a complaint against an 
adult child for failing to provide necessary food, shelter, care, and clothing. 
See id. § 13-103(b)(3). 
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given the holding in Carroll County Department oj Social Services 
v. Edelmann,167 no alternatives were available. 168 
C. Gender and the Bridges Distinction 
While the court attempted to distinguish Green from Bridges, 
the two cases are, in fact, quite similar. By failing to either overrule 
Bridges or properly distinguish the two cases, the court granted 
greater protection to children's relationships with their father than 
children's relationships with their mother. 
The court claimed these cases are distinguishable because the 
child in Bridges stood to gain greater rights from the adoption, 169 
while the children in Green would be adversely affected by the 
adoption.170 A closer look, however, reveals that in each case the 
children would be losing a parent, while purportedly gaining nothing. 
While the child in Bridges l7l was born out of wedlock, the child's 
father had clearly established his paternity by the time he attempted 
to adopt his child.172 The father's name was on the child's birth 
certificate. 173 Additionally, the father had acknowledged his paternity 
in writing, and this had formed the basis for a court's recognition 
of his paternity.I74 Moreover, the father had physical custody of the 
child. 175 Likewise, in Green, the mother had custody.176 Thus, in each 
case, the parent attempting to adopt was already the legitimate parent 
of the children to be adopted. 
In both cases, the court acknowledged that the adoption would 
have the effect of severing the other parent's ties to the children. In 
Green, 177 the court invalidated the adoption because of this concern. 178 
In Bridges, however, the court remanded to determine whether it 
167. 3~ Md. 150, 577 A.2d 14 (1990). 
168. See id. at 175-76, 577 A.2d at 26. In Edelmann, the court held that the only 
way to terminate a parent's rights was through guardianship or adoption. See 
id. 
169. See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 129, 656 A.2d 773, 778 (1995). 
170. See id. at 128, 656 A.2d at 778. See supra part IV.B for a discussion of 
potential benefits and losses. 
171. 304 Md. 1, 497 A.2d 142 (1985). 
172. See id. at 2-3, 497 A.2d at 142-43. See supra note 74 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Maryland's legitimation statute. 
173. See Bridges, 304 Md. at 3, 497 A.2d at 142-43. 
174. See id. 
175. See id. at 3, 497 A.2d at 1143. 
176. See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 129, 656 A.2d 773, 778 (1995). Note 
that unwed mothers, unlike unwed fathers, need not establish that a child is 
their biological child; it is presumed. Cf. MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
310 (1991) (describing "criteria" for being a natural father). 
177. 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995). 
178. See id. 
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would be in the child's best interest "to grant the adoption and thus 
terminate all of his parental ties to his mother. "179 The Bridges court, 
thus, implicitly recognized that cutting off one natural parent's rights 
in favor of the other might be in a child's best interest. 18o When 
faced with severing the father's rights in Green, however, the court 
saw it as an impermissible misuse of the adoption process. 181 
Furthermore, the Bridges court did not find, as the Green court 
concluded, that "the child acquired greater rights as an adopted child 
than had the child merely been acknowledged under the legitimation 
statute." 182 The Bridges court stated that it was unclear whether the 
child would acquire any greater rights if adopted and remanded the 
case for a determination of this issue.183 Thus, it is unclear whether 
the child would actually have gained any benefit that would have 
been recognized by the court in Green. 184 
What makes a decision based on this distinction even less compel-
ling is the fact that in Green the father consented,185 while in Bridges, 
the mother refused to consent. 186 In fact, in Bridges, the child's custody 
was the subject of pending litigation.l87 While the court appears to 
question the mother's motives in Green, the court had an equal or 
greater reason to question the father's motives in Bridges. 
When read together, these decisions demonstrate the court's will-
ingness to terminate a child's relationship to his or her mother, while 
evidencing the court's reluctance to sever a similar relationship with the 
father. 188 
D. State Intervention in the Familj89 
In Green v. Sollenberger,19O the court espoused a rigid deflnition 
of family and gave the state the power to intercede to enforce it. 191 The 
179. Bridges, 304 Md. at 14, 497 A.2d at 148. 
180. See id. 
181. See Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778. 
182. Id. 
183. See Bridges, 304 Md. at 14, 497 A.2d at 148. 
184. See supra part IV.B. 
185. See Green, 338 Md. at 123, 656 A.2d at 775. 
186. See Bridges, 304 Md. at 3, 497 A.2d at 143. 
187. See id. 
188. But see supra note 154. 
189. See generally Levesque, supra note 25, at 20. Levesque wrote that regulating 
the relationships among family members has traditionally been beyond the 
domain of the courts. See id. He suggested, however, that the courts have 
become increasingly involved in the family as a result of welfare reform 
proposals and policies. See id. at 20-21. 
190. 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995). 
191. See id. 
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court allowed the state to bring suit to invalidate an adoption decree 
that was consented to by all the parties involved.l92 The father and the 
children consented to the adoption, as did the mother by filing for the 
adoption. 193 
The court's decision reaffirmed a rigid construction of family.l94 
This is illustrated by the court's suggestion that had Green's husband 
been named in the petition for adoption, it would have been valid. l9S 
Although failure to join her husband was itself a violation of section 
5-315,ISli the court was more concerned that "by failing to join her new 
husband in the adoption petition [Green] effectively left her children 
fatherless." 197 The narrow view of the family espoused by this court, 
as well as in section 5-315, may have a lasting impact on nontraditional 
families.l98 For example, the court seems to suggest that, while a mother 
and a father are fully capable of raising children, a single mother is 
not. 199 Significantly, Maryland law expressly provides for adoption by 
a single mother ,100 Further, in light of this case, one must also wonder 
why the court in Bridges remanded to determine if it would be in the 
children's best interest to terminate the mother's rights, thus implying 
that a single father could raise a child. 
192. See id. at 123, 656 A.2d at 775. 
193. See id. 
194. See generally Levesque, supra note 25, at 27 (stating that despite the reality 
"there remains the ingrained notion of the nuclear family as the 'family' 
prototype"). The reality, Levesque explains, is that there has been a dramatic 
increase in the proportion of children living in single parent homes. See id. 
Levesque argues that this idealized conception of family has hindered legal 
reform. See id. at 27 n.146 (citing with approval Margaret L. Andersen, 
Feminism and the American Family Ideal, 22 J. COMPo FAM. STUD. 235 (1991». 
195. See Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778. 
196. Section 5-315 provides that "[i]f petitioner for adoption is married, the peti-
tioner's spouse shall join the petition." FAM. LAW § 5-315. 
197. Green, 338 Md. at 129, 656 A.2d at 778 (emphasis added). 
198. Cf, Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay 
Arrangements: A Paradigm For Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER 
& L. 183 (1995) (evaluating possibilities for gay parenthood). 
199. It may be argued that the court was merely pointing out that by not joining 
her husband she was not following Maryland law. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAW § 5-315(a) (1991) ("If a petitioner for adoption is married, the petitioner's 
spouse shall join in the petition .... "). The language used by the court, 
however, indicates that this was not their main concern. The court mentions 
this violation only in a footnote. See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 129 
n.5, 656 A.2d 773, 778 n.5 (1995). Moreover, in the text of its opinion, the 
court states "Green, by failing to join her new husband in the adoption 
petition, has effectively left her children fatherless . ... " Id. (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
200. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. But see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAW § 5-315(a) (1991) ("If a petitioner for adoption is married, the petitioner's 
spouse shall join in the petition .... "). 
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Moreover, legal scholars have suggested that adoption is an im-
portant vehicle for allowing gay couples, who are unable to legally 
marry, to take on equal legal roles in a child's life. 201 This inevitably 
requires the termination of the rights of one of the biological parents.202 
This decision may also have an impact on the related issue of surrogate 
motherhood, which requires the natural parent keeping the child to 
adopt the child. 203 
E. Welfare, Adoption, and Poverty: A Dual System 
The significance of Green's AFDC payments should not be over-
looked. Green would be a very different case, and probably would not 
have been brought at all, had Green and her children not been dependent 
on the state. Green, Lenick, and her children all consented to the 
adoption. 204 It took the involvement of the Executive Director of 
Maryland's Child Support Enforcement Agency, to challenge the existing 
adoption decree.lOS In fact, the Executive Director did not become 
involved until Lenick fIled a petition in a Pennsylvania court to be 
relieved of his child support obligations. 206 
Monetarily, the granting of such a petition would make no differ-
ence to Green or her children. At that point, Lenick's payments had 
been assigned to the State of Maryland due to his continuing failure to 
pay on time or, at times, his failure to make payments at all.207 The 
state then intervened to prevent the Pennsylvania court from allowing 
him to escape his obligation. 2aI The state would have had no reason to 
become involved had Green not been receiving AFDC payments. More 
than a year had passed since a Maryland court had granted the 
adoption.209 It was only when Lenick attempted to have the Pennsylvania 
court relieve him of his obligations to the children that the State of 
Maryland became concerned that an adoption of children by their 
natural mother might be against public policy. 210 
201. See Hollandsworth, supra note 198, at 234-39. 
202. See id. at 235. Professor Hollandsworth suggests that termination of the birth 
mother's rights is necessary "[t)o avoid the legal uncertainty created by merely 
placing the child in the father's custody and to effectuate the legal creation of 
the gay family." Id. at 234. 
203. See id. 
204. See Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 123, 656 A.2d 773, 775 (1995). 
205. See id. 
206. See id. 
207. See id. at 122, 656 A.2d at 775. 
208. See id. at 123, 656 A.2d at 775. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
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This is important because it suggests a dual system of both welfare 
and adoption - one for the poor and one for the rest of society.211 If 
the state only becomes involved in cases of natural parent adoption 
when the natural parent is receiving AFDC, then only poor women will 
be prevented from adopting their own children. Women with other 
means of support will be able to escape such state scrutiny. 212 While 
many would argue that it is unfair for the state to be forced to support 
children just because their fathers do not want anything to do with 
their children, it is equally unfair to subject poor women to additional 
scrutiny and reduced stability in their relationship with their children.213 
Moreover, a child's best interest and relationship with his or her parents 
should not be dictated by the amount of money their parents have. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement AdministratiorP-14 sug-
gested that Maryland courts should not allow one parent to consent to 
adoption in order to terminate child support payment arrearage. 21S Yet, 
Maryland adoption law provides for natural parents to consent to the 
211. Sir! Levesque, supra note 25, at 6 (suggesting that the current welfare system 
creates a "'dual system of family law,' one- for poor fathers and one for the 
rest of society"). Levesque notes that assignment of poor women's support 
rights to the state was purportedly implemented to protect poor women. See 
id. at 35. Significantly, Levesque argues, poor women strenuously opposed 
such reforms for a variety of reasons. See id. For example, it is argued, such 
assignments do not always, or even often, benefit the children. See id. at 37. 
Furthermore, women and their children may, in fact, wind up with less money 
- than if they had not assigned their rights. See id. at 36. Finally, there is a 
potential that a man forced by the state to pay child support may counter-sue 
for custody in order to avoid child support obligations even when the father 
has no interest in actually raising the children. See id. 
212. Cf Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based 
Analysis oj Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights oj Welfare 
Beneficiaries, 14 LAW & INEQUITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY & PRACTICE, Dec. 
1995, at 1 (discussing proposed welfare reform and the impact these proposals 
would have on recipients). According to Barksdale, many of these "proposals 
appear designed to punish welfare recipients for violating" traditional societal 
norms "and to manipulate recipients into complying with these norms." [d. 
at 3 (citations omitted). For example, recipients are rewarded for marrying by 
some programs. See id. 
213. Of particular concern, given Levesque's suggestion, is that a real threat exists 
that a man forced by the state to pay child support may counter-sue for 
custody in order to avoid child support obligations despite the fact that the 
father has no interest in actually raising the children. See Levesque, supra note 
25, at 36. 
214. 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991). 
215. See id.; See also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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adoption of their children 216 and for the adoption of a child by a single 
parent.217 
The adoption of a legitimate child by his or her natural parents 
appeared to be permissible after Bridges v. Nicely.2ls However, in Green 
v. Sollenberger, the court of appeals departed from this position and 
declared a mother's adoption of her own natural children invalid.219 
While the distinction between Green and Bridges may illustrate the 
court's own struggle with these intricacies of family law, the decision 
is troubling. Denying a natural mother the right to adopt her own child 
mayor may not be good policy, but what is clear is the need for more 
consistency. 
Jennifer R. Terrasa 
216. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. 
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